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Abstract 
   In this paper, we argue that democracies increase government expenditure because 
they produce more public goods with the taxes they collect, while autocracies use 
taxes as rents. In order to test this hypothesis we use data on 61 countries from 1993 
to 2012. As our main independent variable we employ a dichotomous democracy 
measure, based on the theory of regional democratization waves developed by 
Huntington (1991) and used in Acemoglu, et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). Our 
results using a number of estimations show us that democratization waves positively 
affect democracy. Furthermore, our 2SLS, OLS, fixed effects and GMM estimations 
show us that democracy increases spending on public goods and education. When 
controlling for a dataset without African and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage 
results remain the same and the effect on spending is now quantitatively bigger 
suggesting wealthier democracies produce more public goods, compared to poorer 
ones. In addition when using a sample of non-OECD countries we find that 
democracy does not affect spending, further substantiating our hypothesis that 
democracy increases government expenditures but mostly on wealthier democracies.   
 
JEL P16, H5, E62 
Keywords Democracy, Political development, Regional democratization waves, 
Fiscal policy, Government expenditures 
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1. Introduction 
 
   Fiscal policy and more specifically government spending is a major issue in 
economics and politics. Research on the design and implementation of government 
spending programmes is at the forefront of economic policy analysis and is also one 
of the most debated subjects in the political arena. A number of studies on this subject 
have shown that the political system in every country plays an important role in the 
size, scope and composition of spending programmes. More specifically fiscal policy 
choices in democracies are made by the median voter and as a result, government 
spending in democracies is much greater when compared to autocracies because 
voters demand increased expenditures which produce public goods and redistribute 
incomes (Meltzer and Richards (1981,1983), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b)). In 
non-democratic countries, powerful economic and political groups influence public 
policy choices. In such systems, governing elites choose to spend less on producing 
public goods and on redistribution because they stand to gain less from such policies 
and instead reallocate funds to increase their economic and political power as well as 
that of their political friends and allies (Hausken, Martin and Plumper (2004)). 
   In addition to the role that political systems play in determining spending policies, 
some authors have also studied how government expenditures affect political regimes 
and have found that the composition and size of spending programs can have an effect 
on the political regime. More specifically in autocracies, increased government 
spending targeted at specific parts of the population, increases discontent leading to 
revolts which help install a democracy and provide increased government spending in 
favour of the majority of the population(Wintrobe (2001)). In addition, concessions 
made by the ruling élite, in the form of increased government spending, can lead to 
democratization because the poor may view these concessions as a sign of weakness; 
consequently the lower classes revolt and establish a democratic regime which further 
increases expenditures in favour of the majority (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a)).  
   These two different ways of analyzing the relationship between government 
spending and political regimes actually suggest that there exists a two-way causal 
relationship between democracy and government spending where one variable 
influences the other and is in turn influenced by it; to the best of our knowledge, this 
possible two-way causality between democracy and government spending has not 
been the research subject of any other author in the past as well. It is this gap in the 
literature that we try to cover with this paper; more specifically we will alter our 
analysis from that of other authors by analyzing this possible two-way causality and 
trying to find how it influences spending policies. 
    In order to empirically test the two-way causality between democracy and 
government spending, we use the theory of Huntington (1991) and the methodology 
of Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) about regional democratization 
waves. Using this methodology, we treat democracy as a simple dichotomous 
variable; however unlike research by previous authors, we do not assume that only 
domestic politico-economic conditions (Helliwell (1994), Rodrik (1999) Persson and 
Tabellini (2006), Aidt and Jensen (2009), Mutascu(2011)), or political systems but 
only in neighboring countries (Persson and Tabellini (2009)) affect a country’s 
regime. Instead, following Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a), we use a 
2SLS fixed effects model in order to examine how political systems of countries in 
the same geographical area create regional waves of demand for or discontent with a 
given political system in a geographical area, which in turn can influence a country’s 
political regime and its spending decisions.  
 3 
   In our literature review section, we examine how government spending impacts on 
democratization; in addition, we also study the effect of democracy on spending 
policies. Furthermore, we briefly look at some of the determinants of government 
spending and their interaction with government spending choices. We then build a 
very simple macroeconomic model of an autocratic economy which helps us illustrate 
how political regimes can affect a country’s spending choices. Following our 
theoretical model, we analyze the econometric equation and the variables we use to 
find how democracy affects government expenditure. As in Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
and Balamatsias (2017a) we use a two-stage least square (2SLS) fixed effects 
estimation with data from 61 countries from 1993 to 2012, where our endogenous 
variable is a dichotomous democracy index based on civil and political liberties data 
taken from Polity IV and Freedom House and our instrumental variable is the jack-
knifed average of the democracy index of all countries in the same geographical area. 
This method allows us to examine how regional democratization waves influence the 
demand for or discontent with a given political system in a geographical area, which 
in turn affect a country’s political regime and its spending choices.          
   Our results using a number of estimations and robustness tests show us that regional 
democratization waves have a positive and statistically significant correlation with 
democracy. Furthermore, our main 2SLS estimation as well as our OLS, fixed effects 
and GMM estimations show us that democracy increases government spending used 
for producing public goods and general public services and government spending on 
education. When controlling for a  smaller dataset, which does not include African 
and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage results remain the same while the positive 
effect of democracy on government spending is now quantitatively much bigger 
suggesting that wealthier democracies produce more public goods and services, 
compared to poorer ones. This hypothesis is further substantiated when we use a 
smaller sample consisting of non-OECD countries and find no statistically significant 
effect of democracy on government spending. These results further prove that 
democracy increases government expenditure mostly on developed countries because 
they can use increased government spending more effectively in order to increase 
productivity and output, decrease inequality (Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983), 
Boix (2001)) and attract foreign capital (Schulze and Ursprung (1999)) therefore most 
voters in these countries are in favour of such policies.        
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the literature 
related to our subject. In section 3 we develop a simple theoretical model which helps 
us present our main idea, section 4 has an analysis on the data that we use and our 
empirical methodology. In section 5 we present our regression results and Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
   According to many authors, government spending has an impact on 
democratization. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) use a political 
economy model of an autocracy were social unrest due to economic inequality can 
lead to the toppling of politico-economic elites and pave the way for the consolidation 
of democracy. In this model the authors argue that concessions by the ruling elite, in 
the form of increased voting rights and increased government spending, can, in fact, 
lead to full-scale democratization because the poor can view these concessions as a 
sign of weakness; consequently the lower classes choose to revolt since they perceive 
the government as weak and establish a democratic regime. Furthermore, Wintrobe 
(2001) reviews the behaviours of dictatorships and tries to propose and develop 
policies towards them. When examining the spending policies which autocracies 
follow the author argues that they tend to redistribute more but only to specific socio-
economic groups which support them and this selective use of government spending 
increases the cost and the difficulty of repressing the rest of the population. As a 
result, in the case of many autocratic regimes increased but selective government 
spending can lead to increased discontent for an autocracy causing the people to 
revolt and install a democracy which then provides increased redistribution for more 
people.     
   Some authors have also argued that democracy leads to increased public goods 
production and increased redistribution. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) argue that 
the redistributive programs which occurred in Western Europe during the 19th and 
20th centuries were the result of democratization and examine this hypothesis using a 
model in which autocracies choose if they will extend the voting franchise or not. In 
case they do, government spending rises since the median voter is now much pooper 
and demands greater redistribution. After the elite’s decision, the poor decide if they 
will revolt or not. If they revolt, the poor always succeed, seize the elite’s wealth and 
capital and use it in economic and home production, receiving all incomes. The 
authors conclude that autocracies prefer to democratize in order to avoid the loss of 
capital and wealth, which results in increased government spending. Hausken, Martin 
and Plumper (2004) develop a theoretical model where governments choose between 
providing rents or pure public goods in order to remain in power. The authors argue 
that when the level of democracy remains low then rents are preferred to the provision 
of public goods. However, as democratic participation increases, rents become 
increasingly costly as a source of political support and governments resort to 
increasing public goods production and provision instead. The authors empirically test 
the validity of their theoretical result and conclude that stronger democratic regimes 
tend to increase the quantity of public goods they produce and offer to their citizens.  
   When examining the effect of the political regime on different types of spending, 
the literature suggests that democracies increase redistribution and public goods 
production in order to lower inequality. Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) examine 
the way majority rule voting and redistributive needs affect fiscal policy using a 
general equilibrium model with income differences. Their results show that 
democracies increase taxes and redistribution in order to lower inequality and increase 
per capita incomes.  Additionally, increased democratization, population growth and 
increases in inequality and incomes also raise taxes and spending. Boix (2001) 
examines how democracy and economic growth impact on fiscal policy. His results 
lead to two conclusions. First, as the economy grows and per capita income increases, 
production of public goods and capital rises to increase productivity, output and 
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income and reduce inequality. However, since taxes are decided by the median voter a 
necessary condition for increasing government spending is a democratic political 
system where the majority of the population belongs to the middle-income class 
because only they benefit from increased government spending and are in favour of it; 
neither very poor nor very wealthy people benefit from government spending. 
Therefore, only relatively wealthy democracies trying to lower inequality increase 
government spending. On the other hand, some authors argue that inequality increases 
government spending regardless of the political regime by magnifying government 
spending multipliers. Auclert and Rognlie (2016) use an NK, DSGE model where 
skill differences and labour demand shortfalls limit labour supply and income, leading 
to inequality and different MPC. In this model, inequality lowers output because the 
negative covariance between income and the MPC is too small to offset income 
losses. However, inequality increases government spending multipliers, raising 
output, investments and income. Balamatsias (2017b) uses an NK macroeconomic 
model of an economy with imperfectly competitive goods market due to firms’ 
market power and inequality due to skill and wage differences and examines their 
impact on government spending multipliers, output and expenditure. Results show 
that government spending multipliers are always greater than unity due to imperfect 
competition and become bigger as inequality increases, since in highly unequal 
economies more people have a higher MPC. As a result, the net increase in output and 
expenditure caused by increasing government spending is greater in more unequal 
economies. 
   Finally, the combined effect of democracy and globalization has been the subject of 
many studies and authors. Schulze and Ursprung (1999) review the literature on the 
impact of globalization on fiscal policies and the effect of political competition 
combined with economic integration. According to this survey, government 
expenditures under globalization, particularly welfare spending have not been reduced 
because it protects workers from economic uncertainty, unemployment and income 
losses which are caused by market integration. In addition, government spending on 
economic activities such as infrastructure, energy production and manufacturing as 
well as spending on production of public goods and services such as education has 
remained relatively stable because it raises productivity, output and profitability in the 
economy and helps attract private capital. Furthermore, democracy has a positive 
effect on government spending even in a globalized economic environment because 
median voters demand compensation and provision of public goods for worker and 
firms in sectors which are exposed to risks associated with globalization. 
       
    
3 Theoretical considerations 
 
   This section elaborates on the theoretical link between democracy and government 
spending in order to formalize the testable empirical implications of the theoretical 
literature. At first sight, this model appears simple, maybe even simplistic. But our 
goal is not theory for its own sake. This model simply helps us explain how the 
political system in a country affects the size and composition of government 
expenditure. 
   We assume that we have a country ruled by an autocrat. The economy is populated 
by a continuum of identical individuals indexed by i that do not have any control over 
government choices. Individuals in the economy own the capital stock which they 
rent to firms; in addition, they supply labour to firms. They consume a single 
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consumption good produced by the firms as well as a public good produced by the 
government. The utility of the representative individual i when an autocracy is in 
place is given by the following function: 
   ,,, log ciii GCU     (1) 
 
   Where ,iC  and ,ciG  are the quantities of the private and public consumption goods 
respectively. Consumption of private goods equals the income that individuals receive 
from labour and capital i.e.: 
 
 ,, ii YC     (2) 
 
   Where ,iY  equals the income people receive from labour and income when under 
an autocratic regime. 
   Firms in the economy use labour and capital supplied by individuals in the economy 
in order to produce a single consumption good. In addition to these two inputs, firms 
also use public capital which is provided by the government. The production function 
is a simple Cobb-Douglas function with public and private capital: 
    akaaaa GLAKGLKQ ,)1(,,    (3) 
 
   Where A  is total factor productivity, aK capital in the economy, aL labour and 
,kG the public capital produced by the government, under an autocratic regime. It is 
easy to prove that, since both capital and labour are owned by the economy’s 
population, the total income received by the individuals in the economy equals total 
output: 
 
aa QY    (4) 
 
   Government in our model is endowed with a fixed budget B which is allocated 
between producing government consumption goods ( aciG , ), government capital ( akG , ) 
and rents (R) which are used solely by the elite similarly to Hausken, Martin and 
Plümper (2004): 
 
RGGB kaci  ,,     (5) 
 
   In an autocracy rents compose a large part of the government budget compared to 
democracies; on the other hand democratic governments allocate recourses according 
to the choice of the majority; therefore under a democratic regime the sum of the 
government budget is used to produce public capital and public goods and rents are 
equal to zero. 
   In the beginning of each period the economy’s population can choose to stage a 
revolution and take power in their hands by establishing a democracy. We assume that 
once a revolt takes place it is always successful; however it comes at a cost as in 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) where a share   of private capital, and labour is 
destroyed as a result of the revolutionary process. As a result only the remaining share 
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)1(   is used in production. The above imply that the new quantities of private 
capital ( dK ) and labour ( dL ) in a democracy are equal to: 
   ad KK  1   (6) 
 
ad LL )1(    (7) 
 
   Public capital and public consumption goods are also similarly affected, however 
since the political system in place now is a democratic the share of the government 
budget which was used for rents (R) is now used to produce public capital and public 
consumption goods. Consequently the quantity of public consumption goods and well 
as public capital can now be less than, equal to, or greater than it was before. 
Assuming that a percentage λ of the rents is used to increase public capital and (1-λ) 
to increase public consumption goods, we formulate the following relationships about 
public capital ( dkG , ), public consumption goods ( dciG , ) and total output in the 
economy respectively (  GLKQd ,, ), under a democratic regime: 
 
RGG akdk   ,, )1(   (8) 
 
RGG acidci )1()1( ,,     (9) 
 
   dkadadd GLAKGLKQ ,)1(,,    (10) 
 
   Finally the utility of the representative citizen i under a democratic regime is equal 
to: 
  dcididi GCU ,,, log    (11) 
 
   In this model, the decision to revolt and install a democracy is made by the citizens 
once they examine the effect that democratization will have on output and income, but 
more importantly on consumption and utility. We denote the probability that a 
country i exits from autocracy and installs a democracy in time period t as  1,0, tcD , 
where 0 means that country c remains an autocracy and 1 that country c becomes a 
democracy. We then obtain the following relationship: 
 






,,
,,
, 1
0
idi
idi
tc UUif
UUif
D        (12) 
 
   According to (12) if increased government spending cannot compensate for the 
losses the economy would suffer as a result of the revolutionary process and increase 
citizens’ utility then 0, tcD  and citizens choose not to revolt and the country’s 
regime remains autocratic. If instead increased government spending not only 
compensates for the losses the economy suffers due to the revolutionary process but 
also increases the utility of citizens then 1, tcD  and citizens choose to revolt and 
install a democracy. 
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4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data 
 
   In order to construct our main dependent variable we use a classification of 
government expenditures based on Profeta, Puglisi and Scabrosetti (2013). Following 
this method, we group government expenditures in four separate categories which we 
interchangeably use as our dependent variable: Government expenditure on 
production of public goods and services (General spending) spending on healthcare 
(Health spending), spending on education (Education spending), and spending on 
social protection (Social protection spending). 
   Data on expenditure are taken from the IMF government finance statistics and are 
presented as percentage of GDP. 
 
4.2 Construction of the regime measure1 
 
   In this section, we analyze the empirical strategy we use to measure and construct 
our political regime variable, which will help us study the effect of democracy on 
government spending. Our analysis is based on the theory of Huntington (1991) and 
the methodology of Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) about regional 
democratization waves. Research by previous authors assumed that a country’s 
political regime is affected only by domestic economic and political conditions 
(Helliwell (1994), Rodrik (1999) Persson and Tabellini (2006), Aidt and Jensen 
(2009), Mutascu (2011)), or only by the political regimes of neighboring countries 
(Persson and Tabellini (2009)). Our own analysis makes completely different 
assumptions about democracy and has not been used before in examining the 
relationship between democracy and government spending. More specifically, and 
following Huntington (1991), Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) we 
assume that democratizations or reversals to autocracy occur in regional waves 
because countries in the same area share economic, political, historical and cultural 
ties and face similar problems. Therefore the diffusion of demand for or discontent 
with a political system is much easier to happen in countries in the same geographical 
area and impacts on political systems and their spending choices. To test this 
hypothesis, we construct a single dichotomous variable based on political and civil 
liberties as our endogenous variables and a jack-knifed average constructed by using 
the democracy index of all other countries in the same geographical area as our 
instrumental variable; we then use these two variables in a 2SLS fixed effects 
regression. 
   Following Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) we use data from the 
Polity IV project and Freedom House in order to construct our democracy index and 
our jack knifed average. More specifically Polity IV uses data on free elections, the 
existence of legal limitations to the exercise of executive power by a government and 
its chief executives and inclusive participation and representation by political parties. 
Freedom House uses an index related to the protection of civil and political rights in a 
country. 
                                               
1 For a more detailed analysis on the methodology used in this paper and on the institutional variations 
used to categorize countries as democracies or autocracies, see Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and 
Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) 
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   Based on the datasets of Polity IV and Freedom House and on Acemoglu et al. 
(2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) we construct an index of the political regime Dct ∈ 
{0,1} for a country c on time t. More specifically the political system in a country is 
defined as autocratic or democratic by employing a single dichotomous variable Dct 
∈ {0,1} where 0 means that the country c is an autocracy and 1 means that the 
country c is a democracy. We calculate the regime variable using the following 
specification:     
   We code a country c as democratic (Dct =1) in year t if Polity IV gives it a positive 
score (The Polity IV index takes prices between -10 and +10) or if Freedom House 
categorizes the country as “Free” or “Partially Free”. Alternatively, if a country 
receives a negative score on Polity IV or is categorized as “Not Free” in Freedom 
House then it is coded as autocratic (Dct =0).     
   Finally, as in Balamatsias (2017a) we test the robustness of our results by using a 
continuous variable in order to denote a country as democratic or autocratic. Using the 
Polity IV dataset, we code a country c in year t as democratic if it has a value between 
1 and 10 in Polity IV (Dct ∈ {1,10}). Countries given a value of -1 to -10 in the 
Polity IV dataset are instead coded as autocratic (Dct ∈ {-1,-10}). 
 
 
4.3 Control Variables 
 
   In addition to our main explanatory variable we use a number of control variables in 
order to ensure a robust econometric result. These are some of the factors which the 
relative literature considers having some kind of effect on government spending aside 
from the political regime. Data for all the control variables we use come from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), the IMF Government Finance 
Statistics and the OECD public sector, taxation and market regulation databases. We 
also use simple historical data based on election dates and the political history of our 
sample countries in order to construct some of our dummy variables. 
   First we use GDP per capita (income), expressed in constant 2010 US$ prices. 
Higher per capita income is associated with increased government spending for 
redistribution, production of public goods and government investments so we believe 
this variable will have a positive effect on government spending.      
   In addition we use data on economic integration (openness) by using the sum of 
imports and exports as percentage of GDP. This variable will probably have a positive 
effect on Social protection spending, Education spending and General spending 
because economic integration increases spending on welfare programs in order to 
lower economic uncertainty and unemployment as well as production of public goods 
which increase output and productivity and help attract capital. 
   An additional dataset which we make use of is that of income inequality (inequality) 
by using the Gini index. We expect a positive relationship between this variable and 
our dependent variables because greater economic inequality is associated with 
increased government spending, because median voters in democracies demand 
redistributive government expenditure and also because inequality increases the size 
of government spending multipliers.. We also control for the population of a country 
(population). We expect that a country’s population will have a positive effect on 
government spending because income inequality tends to increase when the 
population increases and also because of median voter pressures for redistribution.        
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   In order to achieve the best overall fit for our estimation we also employ a number 
of variables which are typically considered as having an effect on macroeconomic 
policy. We use data on gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP (Investment) 
following the hypothesis that productive government spending and private investment 
acts as complementaries while other types of public spending crowd out investment 
(Argimón, González-Páramo and Alegre (1995), Xu and Yan (2014)). We also 
employ data on the number of people over the age of 65 as a percentage of the entire 
population (Elderly) a variable which we believe has a positive effect on government 
spending due to increased demand for government welfare programs from older 
people (Lassila, Valnoken and Alho (2014), Bloom et. al. (2015)). We also use data 
on higher educational attainment (Education) as in Mutascu and Danuletiu (2013) as 
well as three dummy variables: Socialist a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country was 
a former socialist state and 0 otherwise, (Rodrik (1999)).Second, data on election 
years (elections) a variable equal to 1 in year t if a country holds elections and equal 
to 0 otherwise (Drazen and Elsava (2010)). Finally we use a dummy on oil exports as 
percentage of GDP (oil exporter) which gives a country a value of 1 if it collects 
revenues from oil equal to 30% of GDP or higher and 0 otherwise, (Fearon and Laitin 
(2003)).  
 
 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
   In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for our variables. Table 2 we present the 
correlation matrix of our variables 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
4.5 Econometric model 
 
   The main econometric equation we will use in order to examine the effect of the 
political regime in a country’s government spending will be based on Acemoglu et al. 
(2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). More specifically we will be using a Two–stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression where the endogenous variable will be each country’s 
political regime index and the instrumental variable will be the jack-knifed average of 
the democracy index of all countries in the same geographical area. Both of these 
indexes are constructed using data on political and civil liberties and are the same as 
those used in Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). The panel dataset that 
we will use comprises data on 61 countries from 1993 to 2012. Data on government 
spending and our control variables are expressed in logarithmic form.  
 
 
4.6 Basic econometric specification   
 
   The basic estimation that we will use in order to examine the effect of a country’s 
political regime on its government spending is based on the estimation used in 
Balamatsias (2017a): 
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ctcctitctct ContolsDemocracyaSpending    1110   (1) 
 
   Where Spendingct represents interchangeably general government spending, 
spending on education, spending on healthcare, and social protection spending. 
Democracyct-1 is the democracy index of country c time for the time period t-1. 
Controlsct-1 stands for the set of control variables of country c for the time period t-1. 
We also control for country and time effects which are denoted respectively by γc and 
δt. Finally εct is the error term and αο our constant. 
     As we have seen in Wintrobe (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b) and 
Hausken, Martin and Plumper (2004) the size and composition of government 
expenditure can bring transitions to democracy and at the same time democratic 
transitions can bring increases in government spending. Therefore, we assume that 
these two variables have a two-way causal relationship between them where both of 
them influence and can be influenced by the other and we test this hypothesis by 
using a 2SLS fixed effects model as in Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a). Following this methodology, we assume that democracy in country c is 
influenced by the political regime of all other countries in the same geographical area. 
For this reason we use regional waves of democratization and regional transitions to 
autocracies as an instrumental variable and examine their impact on our endogenous 
variable, Democracy-1. We begin by defining the set of countries that influence 
demand for democracy in a given country. Following Acemoglu et al. (2014) and 
Balamatsias (2017), for every country c, we use the country’s democracy index at the 
start of our sample, Dct0 to denote this country’s political regime (democracy or 
autocracy). Then we use Rc to denote the geographical region in which country c lies. 
Democracy in country c is influenced by democracy in the set of countries Ic = {c′: c′ 
≠ c, Rc′ = Rc, Dc′t0 = Dct0}. This set includes all countries which are in the same region 
as country c that share a common political history. 
   The regional influence to democratize that country c faces, Zct is based on the 
following equation which is also used in Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a): 



Icc
tc
c
ct DI
Z '
1
              (2) 
    
   Where Zct is the jack-knifed average of democracy in a region times the initial 
regime cell, which leaves out the own country observation. This equation shows how 
the political system in a given country is affected by the regimes in countries in the 
same geographical area by creating diffusion of demand for or discontent with a 
political system. 
    Using (2) gives us our first stage equation we will use: 
 
Democracy 1ct  = j Ζ 1ct +u 1ct                                                             (3) 
 
   Combining (1) and (3) we have the two-stage least squares panel data model which 
we estimate: 
 
ctcctitctct ContolsDemocracyaSpending    1110                                                                                                                                                        
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                                                                                                                                                                                (4)                                                                                                      
Democracy 1ct  = j Ζ 1ct +u 1ct                                                                                                    
 
5. Results 
 
       Our dataset consists of 61 countries from 1993 to 2012. All of our regressions 
have been made using robust standard errors. Because our main research questions, 
methodology, variables and data are similar to the ones used in Balamatsias (2017a), 
we also use the same estimation methods and postestimation tests. We first run an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model. In addition we also use a simple fixed effects 
(F.E.) regression, and an Arellano-Bond GMM regression. Our main estimation is a 
2SLS fixed effects regression with both country and time effects, which help us 
control for individual unobservable effects in our sample of countries as well as for 
the endogeneity of the main explanatory variable, Democracy-1.  
   Our postestimation tests consist of a Wooldridge test to test for serial correlation 
and a Crag Donald F-statistic which help us check for instruments validity i.e. 
instruments not correlated with the error term. The results show that there exists no 
serial correlation, that we have valid instruments and that the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equations. We also perform an endogeneity 
test to see if a 2SLS regression is the right estimation used or if a simple OLS model 
would be sufficient. The results indicate that a 2SLS model is in fact the model we 
need to use. Finally, in order to ensure that there have no imperfect exogeneity issues 
we include our instrumental variable, Zct-1 as a repressor both in our OLS and in our 
fixed effects estimations as in Baum (2008), and find that Zct-1 negatively affects 
Social protection spending at a 10% significance level in the OLS estimation with a 
significant coefficient of -0.226. Therefore we conclude that imperfect exogeneity is 
not an important problem in our estimations of General spending, Education spending 
and Health spending since it only seems to affect Social protection spending.   
   In the following tables we present our estimation results. Each one of the columns 
presents the results when the dependent variable is respectively General spending, 
Education spending Health spending and Social protection spending. We begin our 
analysis by estimating the OLS and the fixed effects (F.E.) estimators for each one of 
our dependent variables interchangeably. Following that we run an Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimation. We then run a 2SLS fixed effects regression, which we present in 
two tables; the first table gives us the results of the first stage regression and the 
second table the results of our second stage regression. We begin with Table 3, which 
gives us the results of our OLS regression. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
   In Table 3, we present our OLS estimations. Our main finding is that Democracy-1 
positively affects Education spending and Social protection spending at a 1% 
significance level, negatively affects General spending also at a 1% significance level 
while Health spending seems to be unaffected by this index.. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is also quite big, being 0.102 for Education spending, 0.269 for Social 
protection spending and 0.051 for General spending. We also find evidence that 
regional democratization waves, presented here by our variable Zct-1 do not have a 
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direct impact on most spending variables; the only exception being the positive effect 
they have on Social protection spending. The magnitude of this coefficient is also 
very big, (-0.226) so the direct effect of regional democratization waves on social 
protection is quite significant.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
Our estimation for the fixed effects estimations are given in Table 4. As seen from the 
results Democracy-1 has a positive effect on General spending at a 10% significance, 
level with a coefficient of 0.064; however none of the other dependent variables area 
affected by this variable. Looking at the effect of our control variables we find that 
most of them perform as we expect them to, according to the relevant literature.   
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
   Table 5 gives us the results of our Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. We used two-
period time lags for our democracy index and a single period time lag of our 
government spending variables in order to deal with issues of autocorrelation and 
achieve the best overall fit for our estimation. The main finding in this estimation is 
that our democracy index Democracy-1 has a positive impact on General spending at a 
10% significance level, and a negative effect on Health spending and Social 
protection spending at a 10% and 1% significance level respectively. Furthermore, 
past government spending, presented here by the Spending-1 seems to have a 
significant impact on current spending policies. More specifically we can see that 
Spending-1 positively affects General spending (0.526),  Education spending (0.564), 
Health spending (0.495) and Social protection spending (0.552), all at a 1% 
significance level. When it comes to our control variables we find that most of them 
do not have an effect on our spending variables. 
 
[Table 6a here] 
 
[Table 6b here] 
 
Our main findings are given in Tables 6a and 6b, where we present the results of our 
2SLS estimation in which we used our regional waves of democratization index as 
our instrumental variable. We begin with our first stage estimation, given in Table 6a 
and then we move on to our second stage results in Table 6b.  
   Looking at the results in Table 6a we see that the impact of regional 
democratization waves index Zct-1, is statistically significant at a 1% level in all our 
specifications, being 0.518 for General spending, Education spending and Health 
spending, and 0.545 for Social protection spending. This result indicates that regional 
waves of democratization have a positive and highly significant effect on a country’s 
political system; a result which appears to be in accordance with the theory of 
Huntington (1991) as well as the methodology used by Acemoglu et al. (2014) and 
Balamatsias (2017a) about the positive impact of regional waves of democratization 
on a country’s political regime.    
    In Table 6b we present our second stage results. The most important finding is that 
Democracy-1 has a positive effect on General spending at a 10% significance level, 
with a coefficient of 0.285. Education spending is also positively affected by 
Democracy-1 at a 5% significance level with the coefficient being even bigger, at 
0.407. These results seem to suggest that democracy increases government 
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expenditure used for producing goods and general services and spending on 
education. This result is not surprising since as we have seen in Meltzer and Richards 
(1981, 1983), Boix (2001) and Balamatsias (2017a) democracy increases tax 
revenues; therefore it is safe to assume that increased tax revenues should lead to 
increased government spending. When examining which types of government 
spending democracy increases we find that government spending used for production 
of public goods and services and education spending are positively affected while 
spending on defence and public order and social protection spending are not affected. 
This result can be explained by that fact that production of public goods and public 
education can be effectively utilized by firms and individuals in order to increase 
productivity and output in the economy and decrease inequality (Meltzer and 
Richards (1981, 1983), Boix (2001)) as well as help governments attract foreign 
capital by improving output, productivity and profitability (Schulze and Ursprung 
(1999)). Concerning the rest of our independent variables, we observe that they affect 
spending as predicted by the relevant literature the only exceptions being Inequality-1 
Oil exporter-1 and Elections-1 which do not have any effect on our spending variables 
and Education-1 which has a negative effect on General spending. 
   Next, we examine the robustness of our main result. For this reason, we will run 
three additional estimations. In the first one, we run a regression where instead of a 
dichotomous democracy index we use a continuous one, in this case, the Polity IV 
scores for our sample countries. In the second regression, we exclude all countries 
from Africa and the Middle East. Finally, in the third regression, we use a much 
smaller sample consisting only of non-OECD countries. 
 
[Table 7a here] 
 
[Table 7b here] 
 
    Tables 7a and 7b present the estimates when using our continuous index for the 
regional waves of democratization. Looking at the results of our second stage 
regressions in Table 7a we find some considerable differences from our main results. 
More specifically, the effect of regional waves of democratization Zct-1 is now 
negative at a 1% level of statistical significance in all our regressions. Additionally we 
see that the magnitude is now bigger, being -0.433 for General spending Education 
spending and Health spending, and -0.383 for Social protection spending.     
   The results of our second stage regressions are given in Table 7b. Democracy-1 now 
has a negative effect on General spending (-0.054) as well as on Education spending 
(-0.091) both at a 5% significance level. These results further, as well as those in 
Table 7a, are completely different from the theoretical and empirical results of a 
positive relationship between regional waves of democratization and a country’s 
political system seen in Huntington (1991), Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a). In addition, these results cast some doubt on the positive impact that 
democracy has on government spending reported by a number of authors (Boix 
(2001), Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) Schulze and Ursprung (1999)) and by our 
baseline 2SLS OLS, fixed effects and GMM regressions.    
 
 
[Table 8a here] 
 
[Table 8b here] 
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   The results of Tables 8a and 8b are extracted when we exclude North African and 
Middle-Eastern countries from our sample. In Table 8a we can see that even in this 
smaller sample, regional democratization waves, (Zct-1) still have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on our democracy index, but at a 5% significance level 
for all our regressions. Furthermore, when looking at the impact of Democracy-1 on 
government spending it seems that it positively affects General spending at a 5% 
significance level, with a much bigger coefficient of 1.047. Education spending is 
also positively affected by Democracy-1 at a 5% significance level with the coefficient 
being even bigger, at 1.463. These results indicate that democracy increases 
government spending in wealthier democracies much more than it does not poorer 
ones because per capita incomes are higher in wealthier states; consequently the 
majority of the population in these countries belongs to the middle-income class who 
can effectively use public goods and services to increase output and incomes and 
decrease inequality, and as a result vote in favour of increasing expenditure, as in 
Meltzer and Richards (1981,1983) and Boix (2001). The rest of our control variables 
affect government spending as suggested by the relevant literature. 
 
[Table 9a here] 
 
[Table 9b here] 
 
   Finally, we make use of a much smaller sample, comprised of non-OECD countries, 
the results of which are given in Tables 9a and 9b. The first stage results in Table 9a 
shows that the effect of regional waves of democratization remains statistically 
significant at a 1% level as in our baseline estimations. Additionally, we see that the 
magnitude is somewhat bigger compared to our baseline estimation, being 0.657 for 
General spending, Education spending and Health spending, and 0.083 for our Social 
protection spending first stage estimations. 
   The results of our second stage regression, given in Table 9b, show us that 
Democracy-1 has no statistically significant effect on any of our dependent variables 
These results further substantiate that poorer democracies do not generally increase 
government expenditure and that increasing state spending is a habit of wealthier, 
more developed democracies as seen in Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) and Boix 
(2001). 
   To sum up, our empirical results using a number of different specifications and 
robustness tests, seem to verify our main assumption that regional waves of 
democratization in a geographical area increase discontent with autocracy and 
demand for democracy within a country, in line with the theory of Huntington (1991) 
and the methodology used Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) about 
regional democratization waves. In addition, our findings in the second stage 
estimation show us that democratic regimes seem to increase government spending on 
education and production of goods and services but mostly in richer countries because 
voters in wealthier democracies are in favour of increased production of public goods 
and services in order to increase productivity and output in the economy and to 
decrease inequality (Meltzer and Richards ((1981, 1983), Boix (2001)) as well as 
attract foreign capital (Schulze and Ursprung (1999)).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact that regional waves of democratization have on 
a country’s democracy and the effect of democracy on government spending. The 
analysis is carried out using a dataset of 61 countries from 1993 to 2012. Our 
econometric analysis is the same one used by Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a) which is based on the theory of Huntington (1991) about regional waves of 
democratization. Following this methodology we use a 2SLS fixed effects model in 
order to examine how political systems of countries in the same geographical area 
create demand for or discontent with a given political system in a geographical area, 
which in turn can influence a country’s political regime and its spending decisions. 
Our first stage estimation shows that regional waves of democratization positively 
affect a country’s political regime as in Huntington (1991), Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
and Balamatsias (2017a). The results of our main 2SLS estimation, as well as our 
OLS, fixed effects and GMM estimations, show us that democracy increases 
government spending used for producing public goods and public services and 
government spending on education. When controlling for a  smaller dataset, which 
does not include African and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage results remain 
the same while the positive effect of democracy on government spending is now 
quantitatively much bigger suggesting wealthier democracies produce more public 
goods and services when compared to poorer ones. This hypothesis is further 
substantiated when we use a smaller sample consisting of non-OECD countries and 
find no statistically significant effect of democracy on government spending. 
Therefore, we conclude that democracy increases government expenditure on 
developed countries because individuals and firms in these countries use government 
spending more effectively to increase productivity and output, decrease inequality and 
attract foreign capital leading the majority of citizens in these countries to vote in 
favour of greater spending.        
   To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the two-way 
causal relationship between government spending and democracy, since authors in the 
past focused only on how spending affects political regimes, or simply on how 
democracy affects expenditure. In addition, our paper is the first one, which uses 
regional waves of democratization and examines their effect on a country’s political 
regime and consequently on expenditure policies. Therefore, our findings contribute 
to the well-established literature about the relationship between government 
expenditure and democracy and on the determinants of spending policies. Clearly, 
these results and their policy implications call for a deeper understanding of the intra- 
and inter-country mechanisms which affect government spending and fiscal policy in 
general and call for future research on the subject. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the main variables 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Source Expected Sign 
General spending General 
spending on 
public goods 
and services 
(%GDP) 
1030 9.944 4.239 0 50.598 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Education spending Spending on 
education 
(%GDP) 
1029 3.427 2.134 0 23.479 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Health spending Spending on 
healthcare 
(%GDP) 
1029 3.992 2.547 0.145 20.44 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Social protection 
spending 
Spending on 
social welfare  
(%GDP) 
1029 8.543 7.021 0 37.543 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Democracy Democracy 
index dummy 
1240 0.862 0.344 0 1 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
Positive 
Democracy(polity) Polity IV index 1220 7.023 
 
2.755 -10 10 Polity IV dataset Positive 
Zct Jack-knifed 
average of 
democracy 
index 
1240 0.864 0.171 0.333 1 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
No effect 
Zctpolity Jack-knifed 
average of 
Polity IV index 
1220 7.023 2.755 0 9.517 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
No effect 
Gini Gini index 1046 39.908 1.650 36.564 46.217 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Income GDP per capita 1224 17435.13 18534.83 375.14 91593.63 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Openness Exports plus 
imports(%GDP) 
1228 51.400 25.970 16.062 204.585 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Investment Gross capital 
formation 
(%GDP) 
1218 23.601 7.121 0.298 67.910 World Bank development 
indicators 
Negative 
Population Total population 1240 4.84e+07 1.45e+08 242000 1.26e+09 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Elderly People over the 
age of 65 (% of 
population) 
1220 10.673 5.175 2.045 21.163 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Education Tertiary 
education 
enrolment 
(%gross) 
995 45.73 23.47 0.208 110.26 World Bank development 
indicators 
Ambiguous 
Socialist Socialist dummy 1220 0.25 0.433 0 1 Historical data Negative 
Election Election year 
dummy 
1220 0.240 0.427 0 1 Historical data Positive 
Oil exporter Major oil 
exporter dummy 
1218 0.343 0.474 0 1 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1.00                  
2 0.25 1.00                 
3 0.30 0.74 1.00                
4 0.28 0.82 0.58 1.00               
5 0.07 0.32 0.16 0.35 1.00              
6 0.02 0.34 0.18 0.39 0.61 1.00             
7 0.16 0.43 0.23 0.47 0.38 0.25 1.00            
8 0.10 0.44 0.22 0.46 0.42 0.32 0.85 1.00           
9 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00          
10 -0.06 0.48 0.13 0.50 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.36 -
0.05 
1.00         
11 -0.17 0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.16 -
0.03 
0.05 1.00        
12 -0.16 -0.15 -0.04 -0.21 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -
0.11 
-
0.18 
0.09 1.00       
13 0.07 -0.15 -0.23 -0.22 0.01 -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 0.01 -
0.13 
0.31 0.07 1.00      
14 0.12 0.51 0.17 0.64 0.39 0.34 0.68 0.71 -
0.07 
0.52 -
0.03 
-0.06 -0.25 1.00     
15 -0.03 0.42 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.18 0.41 0.50 -
0.08 
0.56 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 0.68 1.00    
16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.26 -
0.01 
-
0.41 
0.24 0.18 -0.15 0.21 0.03 1.00   
17 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 1.00  
18 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.17 -0.36 -0.13 -0.13 -
0.03 
0.01 -
0.19 
-0.14 0.25 -0.13 0.07 -
0.09 
0.01 1.00 
Notes: 1=General spending, 2=Education spending, 3=Health spending, 4=Social 
protection spending, 5=Democracy, 6=Democracy(polity), 6=Zct, 7=Zctpolity, 8=Gini, 
9=Income, 10=Openness,  
11=Investment, 12=Population 13,=Elderly, 14=Education, 15= Education, 16= Socialist, 
17= Elections, 18= Oil exporter 
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Table 3: OLS regressions 
 OLS-General 
spending 
OLS-Education 
spending 
OLS-Health spending OLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.051*** 
(0.020) 
 
0.072 
(0.057) 
 
-0.106 
(0.330) 
 
-0.070*** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.179*** 
(0.052) 
 
-0.091*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.067 
(0.043) 
 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.359*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
 
0.008 
(0.013) 
 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
0.102*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.093 
(0.126) 
 
-0.016 
(0.723) 
 
0.090* 
(0.048) 
 
-0.196* 
(0.114) 
 
0.224*** 
(0.070) 
 
-0.139 
(0.094) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.025) 
 
-0.219* 
(0.130) 
 
-0.006 
(0.040) 
 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
0.089 
(0.063) 
 
0.141 
(0.182) 
 
-1.508 
(1.047) 
 
0.207*** 
(0.070) 
 
-0.598*** 
(0.165) 
 
-0.022 
(0.102) 
 
-0.211 
(0.136) 
 
-0.191*** 
(0.036) 
 
0.448** 
(0.188) 
 
0.069 
(0.058) 
 
0.032 
(0.041) 
 
0.078* 
(0.046) 
0.269*** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.226* 
(0.153) 
 
0.015 
(0.866) 
 
0.366*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.731*** 
(0.142) 
 
0.375*** 
(0.084) 
 
-0.020 
(0.112) 
 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
 
0.610*** 
(0.154) 
 
0.245*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.020 
(0.034) 
 
-0.019 
(0.037) 
R squared 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
0.150 
 
714 
 
10.33 
 
 
 
 
0.199 
 
714 
 
14.57 
 
 
 
 
0.245 
 
714 
 
19.04 
 
 
 
 
0.547 
 
687 
 
67.96 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Fixed effects (F.E) regressions 
 F.E-General 
spending 
F.E-Education 
spending 
F.E-Health spending F.E-Social protection spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
 
0.114 
(0.078) 
 
-0.246 
(0.243) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.055) 
 
0.053 
(0.083) 
 
-0.063 
(0.052) 
 
0.312 
(0.195) 
 
-0.025 
(0.055) 
 
0.012 
(0.008) 
 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.011 
(0.028) 
 
0.217 
(0.086) 
 
-0.005 
(0.269) 
 
0.163** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.094 
(0.064) 
 
0.037 
(0.061) 
 
0.097 
(0.092) 
 
0.114** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.417* 
(0.217) 
 
0.032 
(0.061) 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.145*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.056 
(0.101) 
 
0.471 
(0.314) 
 
-0.016 
(0.080) 
 
0.088 
(0.064) 
 
1.039*** 
(0.144) 
 
0.078 
(0.108) 
 
0.240*** 
(0.067) 
 
0.780*** 
(0.252) 
 
0.113 
(0.071) 
 
0.007 
(0.011) 
 
-0.017 
(0.028) 
-0.203*** 
(0.033) 
 
0.148 
(0.115) 
 
-0.172 
(0.347) 
 
-0.076 
(0.087) 
 
-0.241*** 
(0.084) 
 
0.022 
(0.077) 
 
0.401*** 
(0.122) 
 
0.208*** 
(0.074) 
 
0.819*** 
(0.274) 
 
0.185** 
(0.077) 
 
0.009 
(0.012) 
 
0.028 
(0.031) 
R squared 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
Wooldridge test 
 
0.07 
 
714 
 
3.66 
 
70.73 
 
 
0.04 
 
714 
 
2.13 
 
66.72 
 
 
0.107 
 
714 
 
6.48 
 
78.78 
 
 
0.166 
 
687 
 
10.28 
 
25.00 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 5: Arellano-Bond GMM estimation  
 GMM -General 
spending 
GMM-Education 
spending 
GMM-Health 
spending 
GMM-Social protection 
spending 
Spending-1 
 
 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Democracy-2 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.526*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.094* 
(0.052) 
 
-0.013 
(0.052) 
 
-0.168 
(0.206) 
 
-0.014 
(0.144) 
 
-0.078 
(0.079) 
 
-0.065 
(0.103) 
 
-0.005 
(0.106) 
 
0.384 
(0.368) 
 
0.152 
(0.326) 
 
-0.016 
(0.092) 
 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.043* 
(0.021) 
0.564*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.053 
(0.051) 
 
0.018 
(0.049) 
 
-0.028 
(0.169) 
 
0.093 
(0.117) 
 
0.013 
(0.066) 
 
0.024 
(0.085) 
 
0.077 
(0.089) 
 
0.107 
(0.296) 
 
-0.197 
(0.269) 
 
0.011 
(0.076) 
 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
 
0.027 
(0.018) 
0.495*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.175* 
(0.095) 
 
0.021 
(0.066) 
 
-0.220 
(0.254) 
 
0.453** 
(0.183) 
 
-0.009 
(0.100) 
 
-0.195 
(0.127) 
 
-0.018 
(0.132) 
 
-0.307 
(0.457) 
 
0.173 
(0.385) 
 
0.001 
(0.117) 
 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
 
0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.552*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.159*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.067 
(0.048) 
 
-0.320 
(0.199) 
 
0.003 
(0.133) 
 
0.023 
(0.080) 
 
0.168* 
(0.097) 
 
-0.028 
(0.103) 
 
0.814** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.381 
(0.298) 
 
-0.114 
(0.069) 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 
0.013 
(0.020) 
N 
 
Wald test 
 
Arellano-bond AR(1) test 
 
Arellano-bond AR(2) test  
 
603 
 
129.81 
 
-7.99 
 
-0.76 
 
603 
 
129.24 
 
-8.44 
 
0.56 
 
603 
 
171.10 
 
-8.91 
 
-0.88 
 
5.77 
 
119.33 
 
-5.09 
 
-1.19 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6a: 2SLS first stage regression 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.545*** 
(0.127) 
 
0.785*** 
(0.368) 
 
-0.459** 
(0.091) 
 
-0.377*** 
(0.138) 
 
0.149 
(0.138) 
 
0.419*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.414*** 
(0.077) 
 
-0.274 
(0.292) 
 
-0.045 
(0.082) 
 
0.001 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
685 
 
20.32 
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Table 6b: 2SLS second stage regression 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.285* 
(0.156) 
 
-0.447 
(0.309) 
 
0.154* 
(0.090) 
 
-0.263*** 
(0.073) 
 
-0.250*** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.021 
(0.100) 
 
-0.157* 
(0.087) 
 
0.365* 
(0.058) 
 
-0.017 
(0.058) 
 
0.011 
(0.009) 
 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
0.407** 
(0.189) 
 
-0.385 
(0.375) 
 
0.351*** 
(0.109) 
 
-0.217** 
(0.089) 
 
-0.023 
(0.074) 
 
-0.044 
(0.122) 
 
-0.063 
(0.106) 
 
-0.318 
(0.246) 
 
0.047 
(0.070) 
 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
 
-0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.253 
(0.192) 
 
-0.373 
(0.381) 
 
-0.064 
(0.111) 
 
0.018 
(0.090) 
 
0.042 
(0.075) 
 
0.115 
(0.124) 
 
0.286*** 
(0.108) 
 
0.754*** 
(0.250) 
 
0.109 
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.011) 
 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
0.068 
(0.214) 
 
-0.386 
(0.414) 
 
0.048 
(0.125) 
 
-0.317*** 
(0.099) 
 
-0.009 
(0.082) 
 
0.287* 
(0.149) 
 
0.095 
(0.118) 
 
0.894*** 
(0.281) 
 
0.198** 
(0.079) 
 
0.009 
(0.013) 
 
0.047 
(0.034) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
712 
 
3.06 
 
0.105 
 
21.73 
 
18.75 
 
70.73 
712 
 
1.72 
 
0.129 
 
6.31 
 
18.75 
 
66.72 
712 
 
5.20 
 
0.130 
 
0.31 
 
18.75 
 
78.78 
685 
 
7.90 
 
0.144 
 
16.88 
 
20.32 
 
25.00 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7a: 2SLS first stage regression- Alternative Zct variable 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1polity  
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.383*** 
(0.166) 
 
8.709** 
(4.371) 
 
-2.377** 
(1.092) 
 
1.630 
(1.051) 
 
2.949*** 
(0.976) 
 
-0.596 
(1.527) 
 
7.386*** 
(0.921) 
 
2.490 
(3.576) 
 
2.103** 
(0.971) 
 
0.149 
(0.159) 
 
-0.699* 
(0.398) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
685 
 
5.30 
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Table 7b: 2SLS second stage regression- Alternative Zct variable 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1polity 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.054* 
(0.029) 
 
0.348 
(0.441) 
 
-0.118 
(0.126) 
 
-0.061 
(0.111) 
 
-0.039 
(0.126) 
 
0.029 
(0.127) 
 
0.385 
(0.242) 
 
0.377 
(0.292) 
 
0.087 
(0.104) 
 
0.022 
(0.014) 
 
-0.057 
(0.040) 
-0.091** 
(0.039) 
 
0.871 
(0.583) 
 
-0.078 
(0.166) 
 
0.104** 
(0.146) 
 
0.323* 
(0.167) 
 
0.017 
(0.168) 
 
0.819** 
(0.320) 
 
-0.291 
(0.386) 
 
0.227* 
(0.137) 
 
0.014 
(0.019) 
 
-0.092 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
 
-0.488 
(0.389) 
 
-0.021 
(0.111) 
 
-0.001 
(0.098) 
 
0.075 
(0.112) 
 
0.017 
(0.112) 
 
0.336 
(0.214) 
 
0.786*** 
(0.258) 
 
0.160* 
(0.092) 
 
0.011 
(0.012) 
 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
 
-0.452 
(0.465) 
 
0.074 
(0.143) 
 
-0.336*** 
(0.115) 
 
-0.058 
(0.140) 
 
0.328** 
(0.136) 
 
-0.013 
(0.288) 
 
0.885*** 
(0.299) 
 
0.157 
(0.113) 
 
0.006 
(0.015) 
 
0.059 
(0.046) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
712 
 
1.63 
 
0.152 
 
10.97 
 
7.96 
 
75.69 
712 
 
1.01 
 
0.200 
 
18.31 
 
7.96 
 
69.87 
712 
 
4.81 
 
0.134 
 
0.40 
 
7.96 
 
80.82 
685 
 
6.95 
 
0.154 
 
1.43 
 
5.29 
 
25.08 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8a: First stage regression-Excluding African countries 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.384** 
(0.177) 
 
0.541 
(0.385) 
 
-0.526** 
(0.133) 
 
0.306*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.179** 
(0.089) 
 
0.377*** 
(0.138) 
 
0.318* 
(0.164) 
 
-0.059 
(0.310) 
 
-0.221 
(0.289) 
 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 
-0.071** 
(0.032) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
604 
 
8.66 
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Table 8b: Second stage regression-Excluding African countries 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
1.047** 
(0.522) 
 
-0.933 
(0.651) 
 
0.598* 
(0.331) 
 
-0.511** 
(0.208) 
 
-0.417*** 
(0.146) 
 
-0.172 
(0.218) 
 
-0.344 
(0.299) 
 
0.267 
(0.376) 
 
0.222 
(0.355) 
 
0.008 
(0.016) 
 
0.040 
(0.052) 
1.463** 
(0.722) 
 
-1.214 
(0.900) 
 
1.471*** 
(0.458) 
 
-0.793*** 
(0.288) 
 
-0.392* 
(0.202) 
 
-0.425 
(0.302) 
 
-0.572 
(0.413) 
 
-0.861* 
(0.520) 
 
0.845* 
(0.492) 
 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
 
0.090 
(0.072) 
0.041 
(0.375) 
 
-0.698 
(0.467) 
 
0.529** 
(0.238) 
 
-0.238 
(0.150) 
 
-0.073 
(0.105) 
 
-0.077 
(0.156) 
 
-0.012 
(0.214) 
 
0.260 
(0.270) 
 
0.565** 
(0.255) 
 
0.008 
(0.011) 
 
0.017 
(0.037) 
0.570 
(0.555) 
 
-0.305 
(0.588) 
 
0.639** 
(0.363) 
 
-0.539*** 
(0.204) 
 
-0.178 
(0.135) 
 
0.097 
(0.257) 
 
-0.306 
(0.287) 
 
0.182 
(0.364) 
 
0.223 
(0.361) 
 
0.002 
(0.016) 
 
0.118 
(0.051) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
631 
 
1.29 
 
0.175 
 
9.63 
 
5.08 
 
74.89 
631 
 
1.26 
 
0.242 
 
20.69 
 
5.08 
 
49.92 
631 
 
5.77 
 
0.126 
 
0.44 
 
5.08 
 
74.31 
604 
 
3.42 
 
0.168 
 
3.83 
 
8.66 
 
55.08 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9a: First stage regression- Non OECD countries 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.655*** 
(0.202) 
 
2.246** 
(0.923) 
 
-0.617*** 
(0.231) 
 
0.396** 
(0.175) 
 
0.061 
(0.198) 
 
0.470* 
(0.285) 
 
0.409* 
(0.227) 
 
0.046 
(0.737) 
 
-0.079 
(0.147) 
 
0.004 
(0.037) 
 
-0.152** 
(0.078) 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
264 
 
10.45 
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Table 9b: Second stage regression-Non OECD countries 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.092 
(0.154) 
 
-0.222 
(0.579) 
 
0.015 
(0.145) 
 
-0.196** 
(0.100) 
 
-0.014 
(0.115) 
 
0.345** 
(0.157) 
 
-0.022 
(0.095) 
 
-0.438 
(0.287) 
 
-0.001 
(0.076) 
 
0.025 
(0.020) 
 
-0.042 
(0.046) 
0.154 
(0.145) 
 
-0.471 
(0.546) 
 
0.453*** 
(0.137) 
 
-0.061 
(0.094) 
 
-0.051 
(0.108) 
 
0.052 
(0.148) 
 
0.305*** 
(0.089) 
 
-0.270 
(0.271) 
 
0.008 
(0.072) 
 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
 
-0.056 
(0.044) 
-0.018 
(0.178) 
 
-0.971 
(0.668) 
 
0.220 
(0.168) 
 
-0.045 
(0.115) 
 
-0.064 
(0.132) 
 
-0.049 
(0.181) 
 
0.195* 
(0.109) 
 
0.139 
(0.331) 
 
0.062 
(0.088) 
 
0.021 
(0.024) 
 
0.006 
(0.053) 
-0.115 
(0.249) 
 
-0.551 
(0.983) 
 
0.165 
(0.220) 
 
-0.201 
(0.160) 
 
0.073 
(0.163) 
 
0.685** 
(0.270) 
 
0.130 
(0.222) 
 
-0.734 
(0.593) 
 
0.185 
(0.120) 
 
0.015 
(0.030) 
 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
293 
 
1.44 
 
0.140 
 
1.27 
 
13.51 
 
66.16 
293 
 
2.89 
 
0.132 
 
1.20 
 
13.51 
 
93.90 
293 
 
1.03 
 
0.162 
 
0.49 
 
13.51 
 
48.07 
264 
 
2.46 
 
0.195 
 
0.10 
 
10.45 
 
23.19 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000a). Democratization or repression? European 
Economic Review, 44(4), 683-693. 
 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000b). Why did the West extend the franchise? 
Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 115(4), 1167-1199. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2014). Democracy does 
cause growth (No. w20004). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Auclert, A., & Rognlie, M. (2016). Inequality and Aggregate Demand. 
 
Aidt, T. S., & Jensen, P. S. (2009). The taxman tools up: An event history study of the 
introduction of the personal income tax. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1), 160-
175. 
 
Argimón, I., González-Páramo, J. M., & Alegre, J. M. R. (1995). Does public 
spending crowd out private investment? Evidence from a panel of 14 OECD 
countries (No. 9523). 
 
Balamatsias, P. (2017a). Democracy and taxation. Economics Discussion Papers, No 
2017-100. Kiel Institute for the World Economy. http://www. economics-ejournal. 
org/economics/discussionpapers/2017-100 Page, 2(2). 
 
Balamatsias, P. (2017b). Inequality, imperfect competition, and fiscal policy. MPRA 
Paper 82178 University Library of Munich, Germany.  
 
Baum, C. (2008, July). Using instrumental variables techniques in economics and 
finance. In German Stata Users' Group Meetings. Stata Users Group. 
 
Bloom, D. E., Chatterji, S., Kowal, P., Lloyd-Sherlock, P., McKee, M., Rechel, B., ... 
& Smith, J. P. (2015). Macroeconomic implications of population ageing and selected 
policy responses. The Lancet, 385(9968), 649-657. 
 
Boix, C. (2001). Democracy, development, and the public sector. American Journal 
of Political Science, 1-17. 
 
Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: 
Theory and evidence. Journal of development economics, 92(1), 39-52. 
 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American 
political science review, 97(1), 75-90. 
 
Hausken, K., Martin, C. W., & Plümper, T. (2004). Government spending and 
taxation in democracies and autocracies. Constitutional Political Economy, 15(3), 
239-259. 
 
 31 
Helliwell, J.F., (1994). Empirical linkages between democracy and economic 
growth. British journal of political science, 24(2), pp.225-248. 
 
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth 
century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma press. 
 
Lassila, J., Valkonen, T., & Alho, J. M. (2014). Demographic forecasts and fiscal 
policy rules. International Journal of Forecasting, 30(4), 1098-1109. 
 
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of 
government. The Journal of Political Economy, 914-927. 
 
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1983). Tests of a rational theory of the size of 
government. Public Choice, 41(3), 403-418. 
 
Mutascu, M. (2011). Taxation and democracy. Journal of Economic Policy 
Reform, 14(4), 343-348. 
 
Mutascu, M., & Danuletiu, D. (2013). The literacy impact on tax revenues (No. 2013-
63). Economics Discussion Papers. 
 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2006). Democracy and development: The devil in the 
details. American Economic Review, 96(2), pp.319-324. 
 
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2009). Democratic capital: The nexus of political and 
economic change (No. w12175). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Profeta, P., Puglisi, R., & Scabrosetti, S. (2013). Does democracy affect taxation and 
government spending? Evidence from developing countries. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 41(3), 684-718. 
 
Rodrik, D., (1999). Democracies pay higher wages. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(3), pp.707-738. 
 
Schulze, G. G., & Ursprung, H. W. (1999). Globalisation of the Economy and the 
Nation State. The World Economy, 22(3), 295-352. 
 
Wintrobe, R. (2001). How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's 
view. Economics of Governance, 2(1), 35-58. 
 
Xu, X., & Yan, Y. (2014). Does government investment crowd out private investment 
in China?. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 17(1), 1-12. 
 
